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Abstract In October 2011, the ‘‘2nd European Network
for Cognitive Systems, Robotics and Interaction’’, EU-
CogII, held its meeting in Groningen on ‘‘Autonomous
activity in real-world environments’’, organized by Tjeerd
Andringa and myself. This is a brief personal report on why
we thought autonomy in real-world environments is central
for cognitive systems research and what I think I learned
about it. The theses that crystallized are that (a) autonomy
is a relative property and a matter of degree, (b) increasing
autonomy of an artificial system from its makers and users
is a necessary feature of increasingly intelligent systems
that can deal with the real world and (c) more such
autonomy means less control but at the same time
improved interaction with the system.
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Cognitive Systems: Flexibility for Intelligence
As the conference organizers, we formulated the theme of
the event as follows: ‘‘We aim to build autonomous arti-
ficial cognitive systems that are to pursue their goals
successfully in real-world environments that cannot be
fully anticipated, that are not fully known and that change
continuously, including other agents …’’ [1]. This
formulation is based on the view that the distinguishing
feature of ‘cognitive’ artificial systems is not so much the
use of higher level, traditionally called ‘cognitive’ features,
but rather flexibility in pursuing the goals of the system—
and one way to achieve this flexibility is through higher
level features, such as planning. (the formulation is
inspired by the mission statement of the EU Unit ‘‘Cog-
nitive Systems and Robotics’’ on http://cordis.europa.eu/
fp7/ict/cognition).
Traditional programming, including traditional AI pro-
gramming, tries to anticipate the perceptual input the sys-
tem might face from environments and to provide a
response to this input. Since sensors are not perfect, actual
environments cannot be fully sensed and not be fully
described, they are often approximated by probabilistic
systems—but the basic setup is the same: we try to provide
an algorithmic connection between input and output. ‘‘And
what else could we possibly do?’’ you might ask. Well, we
could provide the whole system with features that will
make it achieve its goals, which will not only include
bodily features, but also algorithms that make success more
probable, even in environments that we have not
anticipated.
The extreme case on the one end of the spectrum would
be the lookup-table kind of intelligence, which has a finite
list of possible states of the environment in the one-half of
the table and a specific action (or set of actions) in the other
half. This kind of simple reflex system is ‘‘pre-pro-
grammed’’ or ‘‘scripted’’. Note, however, that complex
combinations of factors in such a system can produce fairly
complex behavior that may be ‘surprising’ to the makers.
One extreme case on a different end of the spectrum is a
system that has no information-processing capability, but
only responds to its environment due to its other features,
e.g., its morphology. In this case, no prior ‘‘scripting’’ takes
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place, but the system is equally inflexible. (I assume that
information-processing, digital or analog, is non-trivially
distinguishable from other causal processes by the presence
of components that play the functional role of representa-
tion—a direction that is explored, for example, in [2] or [3,
ch. 2].)
I think it is important not to characterize the feature of
flexibility in terms of ‘action selection’, since this is often a
misleading term for the behavior of intelligent systems:
The problem ‘‘Which action to select next?’’ stems from
the ‘‘Model-Plan-Act’’ view of action (and the ‘‘Intention-
Belief-Desire’’ psychology)—the standard in classical
representational AI. This view focuses on ‘action’ that is
under voluntary control, which leaves out a large part of
intelligent behavior. Many intelligent agents do not seem to
‘select actions’, be they natural (a slug or even a cock-
roach) or artificial (non-classical designs, coupled embod-
ied systems; e.g., a passive dynamic walker does not select
the action ‘‘make the next step’’).
Autonomy
The demand for flexibility thus results in a demand for
autonomy. In a first approximation, autonomy is the ability
of the system to respond to the environment ‘‘by itself’’,
without a prior ‘‘script’’. The Greek word ‘‘autonomy’’
means the ability to give oneself (e)avto ones own law
nomos, thus becoming avtonomos.
However, notions like generating behavior ‘‘by itself’’ or
giving laws ‘‘to oneself’’ are of limited use since the system
is never alone, but is always subject to various causal
influences from the ‘‘outside’’ (if boundaries can even be
specified). In control engineering, autonomy is defined in
terms of interference by the user of the system, where
degrees go from a fully user controlled system to a system
not controlled at all. (Some systems are adaptive in this
respect, i.e., change their level of autonomy depending on
needs [cf. 4].) The notion we appear to need is a relational
one:
X is autonomous from Y if and only if X pursues its
goals without input from Y
This initial definition can be clarified in at least two
ways: The input from Y can be a matter of degree, and thus
X can be more or less autonomous from Y. Also, in many
cases it will be useful to differentiate that X is autonomous
from Y with respect to some type of input or some type of
ability (e.g., spatial orientation).
Note that the Y can be a human being, like the maker or
user of an artificial system, but we can naturally use the
same notion for other agents also: One can say that an
animal is more or less autonomous (e.g., the very young are
often less autonomous) and that autonomy is reduced with
respect to other members of the species, or of other spe-
cies—e.g., in a plant that lives in symbiosis with another,
or in a microorganism that lives inside a larger organism.
On the other hand, if a living being is dependent on a
specific environment, like a particular cave, for example, I
would not call that a reduction of its autonomy. It follows
that X can be autonomous from Y properly only if both X
and Y are agents.
One view that is often heard is that a system is auton-
omous to the degree that it can set its own goals. However,
a system that ‘‘sets its own goals’’ can do so only within
limits provided by the unalterable features of its design, or,
to put it differently: there must be causes for any given
setting of goals. We say that humans have free will, even
though we assume that there are causes for our setting of
goals. If humans consider their goals, decide that they want
to have different goals and adopt them, then this re-setting
is dependent on evaluating the present goals on the basis of
higher-order goals. Indeed, this ability to rationally set
goals and follow them has been considered the core of one
common explanation for what is meant by the idea of
human ‘‘free will’’. This approach typically allows for a
notion of responsibility in a world where all events are
caused [5]. It seems, therefore, that the ability to set goals
is just a further degree of autonomy with respect to another
system; it is just a form of pursuing higher order goals. Of
course, there is the Maturana-Varela tradition, according to
which only living autopoetic systems can truly have goals,
but is this relevant for our purposes, the understanding of
autonomy? Perhaps, it marks an outer bound that certain
degrees of autonomy can only be reached by living sys-
tems—but I would advise against including this ideology in
an initial understanding of the notion (keeping in mind that
any system will have several goals, often on several levels
of description or granularity).
Given this discussion, we might accept a formulation
like this:
Agent X is autonomous from agent Y to the degree
that X pursues its goals without input from Y
Flexibility Through Autonomy in an Environment
If we assume that intelligence is the ability to pursue one’s
goals successfully, then it becomes clear that more auton-
omy does not necessarily imply more intelligence. In par-
ticular, autonomy will only be a useful feature of
intelligence in environments that are not fully anticipated.
It is for this reason that in real-world environments, which
can only be anticipated to a very small degree, autonomy is
a crucial feature of intelligence—in fact the crucial feature,
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together with successful use of the environment, including
other agents (and even these features of the environment
are not specifiable ahead of time, so they require autonomy,
too). In other words, in the real world, an artificial system
must be strongly autonomous of its maker and user to be
successful or intelligent. This stands in stark contrast to the
totally controlled environment of simulation and the highly
controlled environments of industrial robotics today. (One
major reason why the Fukushima disaster happened and
was then dealt with so badly is the absence of autonomous
and thus flexible systems in both phases—no current robot
can deal with the inside of the reactor if we cannot specify
in advance what the inside is like [6].)
One way to explain this point is to look at the agent as
carrying out a task of some complexity in an environment
of some complexity (Fig. 1).
In this space of possibilities, classical robotics provides
solutions in the area that is low in y values, but increasingly
more successful in x values—it achieves complex tasks in
non-complex environments. Natural systems, on the other
hand, are able to deal with high y values, but achieve rel-
atively low scores in the x range—they achieve less com-
plex tasks but in complex environments. Humans are
probably an extreme example in terms of their adaptability
to different environments while also achieving fairly high
scores in certain x sectors—but humans remain the ‘‘faulty
beings’’, as Hans Gehlen called them, that are surpassed in
nearly any ability by some animal (except higher cogni-
tion). Artificial cognitive systems will enable artificial
systems to ‘detach’ themselves from the y baseline and
move into the higher spaces opened up by y. This move
into more complex unspecified environments requires more
autonomy on the part of the systems. (This notion owes
much to the discussions in the 2011 EUCogII workshop
‘‘Challenges for Cognitive Systems’’ at Rapperswil.)
Autonomy as Loss of Control Versus Autonomy
as Gain of Interaction
Given that we have defined autonomy in terms of inde-
pendence from other agents, in particular the maker and
user of a system, it follows that more autonomy implies
less control. This loss of control would seem undesirable
both in terms of performance of the system and in terms of
avoiding undesired behavior of the system, which would
also be less predictable.
I would suggest, however, that these negative effects are
outweighed by positive ones, namely the improved ability
of humans (and other agents) to interact with such systems.
In a different context, I have recently made the obvious
point that human interaction with other agents relies cru-
cially on the attribution of intentions or goals to these
agents [7]. We humans can interact successfully with other
agents just when we can interpret their behavior as driven
by their goals, shown by behavior that provides a resistance
to our own. It is impossible to cooperate with another agent
that has no goals, thus offering no such resistance. Such
interaction will also be a lot easier than technical control—
since we humans are already experts at it.
I conclude that new human–computer interaction (New
HCI) will be properly a form or interaction, less of control.
We must overcome the wish to control the autonomous
cognitive system and begin to interact with it.
Fig. 1 The complexity space
for intelligent agents
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